The open source process of production and innovation seems very unlike what most economists expect. Private firms usually pay their workers, direct and manage their efforts, and control the output and intellectual property thus created. In an open-source project, however, a body of original material is made publicly available for others to use, under certain conditions. In many cases, anyone who makes use of the material must agree to make all enhancements to the original material available under these same conditions. This rule distinguishes open source production from, say, material in the public domain and "shareware. Windows program as the operating system most frequently embedded into products ranging from mobile phones to video recording devices.
2 Open source software is dominant in a number of other areas as well; for example, PERL and PHP are the dominant scripting languages.
Open source software seems poised for rapid growth in the future. A recent survey of chief information officers suggests that Linux will play an increasingly important role as the operating system for web servers. Linux also has plenty of room to grow in the market for desktop operating systems; at the end of 2003, only 1.4 percent of the queries to Google came from machines running Linux, although that share was rising. 3 The dissemination of open source databases remains in its infancy, but these are projected to become by 2006 significant challengers to commercial systems sold by firms such as IBM and Oracle. 2 On web server software and Apache, see <http://news.netcraft.com/archives/web_server_survey.html> (accessed March 21, 2004) . On the use of Linux in web server operating systems, see <http://www.pcworld.com/news/article/0,aid,112840,00.asp> (accessed March 31, 2004) . On the use of Linux for embedded software, see <http://www.linuxdevices.com/articles/AT8693703925.html> (accessed March 21, 2004) . 3 For the survey of chief information officers, see <http://www.morganstanley.com/institutional/techresearch/pdfs/ciosurvey1203.pdf> (accessed March, 21, 2004) . On Linux software used for Google searches, see <http://www.internetnews.com/devnews/article.php/3302941> (accessed March 31, 2004) . 4 The challenge is expected to be led by MySQL, which received a $16 million financing from the venture capital organizations Accel 
A Brief History of Open Source Software
Software development has a tradition of sharing and cooperation. But in recent years, both the scale and formalization of the activity have expanded dramatically with the widespread diffusion of the Internet. We will highlight three distinct eras of cooperative software development.
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During the first era, the 1960s and 1970s, many of the key features of computer operating systems and the Internet were developed in academic settings such as Berkeley and MIT, as well as in central corporate research facilities where researchers had a great deal of autonomy, such as Bell Labs and Xerox's Palo Alto Research Center. Software can be transmitted in either "source code" or "object (or binary) code." Source code is the code using languages such as Basic, C, and Java. Object, or binary, code is the sequence of 0s and 1s that directly communicates with the computer, but which is difficult for programmers to interpret or modify. Most commercial software vendors today provide users only with object or binary code; when the source code is made available to other firms by commercial developers, it is typically licensed under very restrictive conditions. However, in this first era, the sharing by programmers in different organizations of the source code for computer operating systems and for widely used transmission protocols was commonplace. These cooperative software development projects were undertaken on a highly informal basis. Typically no efforts to delineate property rights or to restrict reuse of the software were made. This informality proved to be problematic in the early 1980s, when AT&T began enforcing its (purported) intellectual property rights related to the operating system software UNIX, to which many academics and corporate researchers at other firms had made contributions.
In response to the threats of litigation over UNIX, efforts to formalize the ground rules behind the cooperative software development process emerged, which ushered in the second era. The critical institution during this period was the Free Software GNU is a recursive acronym which stands for "GNU's Not UNIX.") In keeping with the philosophy of the organization that this software should be free to use, free to modify, and free to redistribute, the license aimed to preclude the assertion of copyright or patent rights concerning cooperatively developed software. Also, in exchange for being able to modify and distribute the GNU software, software developers had to agree to (a) make the source code freely available (or at a nominal cost) to whomever the program is distributed and (b) insist that others who use the source code agree to do likewise.
Furthermore, all enhancements to the code-and even in many cases code that intermingled the cooperatively developed software with that developed separately-had to be licensed on the same terms. This kind of license is sometimes called "copyleft," because if copyright seeks to keep intellectual property private, copyleft seeks to keep intellectual property free and available. These contractual terms are distinct from "shareware," where the binary files, but not the underlying source code, are made freely available, possibly for a trial period only. The terms are also distinct from public-domain software, where no restrictions are placed on subsequent users of the source code: those who add to material in the public domain do not commit to put the new product in the public domain. Some projects, such as the Berkeley Software Distribution (BSD) effort, took alternative approaches during the 1980s. The BSD license also allows anyone to freely copy and modify the source code, but it is much less constraining than the General Public License: anyone can modify the program and redistribute it for a fee without making the source code freely available as long as they acknowledge the original source. 
What Motivates Open Source Contributors?
The decision to contribute without pay to freely available software may seem mysterious to economists. However, the standard framework of labor economics can be adapted to capture activity in the open source environment (Lerner and Tirole, 2002) . Economic theory suggests that long-term incentives are stronger under three conditions: 1) the more visible the performance to the relevant audience (peers, labor market, and venture capital community); 2) the higher the impact of effort on performance; 3) the more informative the performance about talent (for example, Holmström, 1999) . 6 The first condition gives rise to what economists call "strategic complementarities." To have an "audience," programmers will want to work on software projects that will attract a large number of other programmers. This argument suggests the possibility of multiple equilibria. The same project may attract few programmers because programmers expect that other programmers will not be interested; or it may flourish as programmers (rationally) have faith in the project. effects and switching costs are very strong, the second-best commercial package might have a tiny market share. In these cases, the cost to corporations of releasing code may be very small. Moreover, such a strategy may reassure potential users that the released software will never be withdrawn (i.e., the user will always be able to maintain the product itself).
This motivation can also depend on the evolution of vertical relationships between small and large firms in the software industry in commercial software environments, a subject that would reward further study. Indeed, many small developers are uncomfortable doing business with leading software firms. They fear that the commercial platform owner has an incentive to introduce substitutes in the developers' segment in order to force prices down in that segment, and to raise the demand for licenses to the broad software platform (Farrell and Katz, 2000) . 
How Does The Legal System Affect Open Source?
9 See also the discussion below of Casadesus-Masanell and Ghemawat (2003) .
Open source software is shaped by the legal rules under which it operates. In each case, the product originator gives users the right to employ the copyrighted code through a license. But the licenses differ tremendously in the extent to which they enable licensors and contributors to profit from the code that is contributed.
In Lerner and Tirole (2005) , we explore what drives firms to choose particular licenses. We begin with a model of license choice. We suppose that an entity, either an However, restrictive licenses are significantly less common for those applications aimed towards software developers. Restrictive licenses are also less common for projects operating in commercial environments or that run on proprietary operating systems.
Projects whose natural language is not English, whose community appeal may be presumed to be much smaller, are more likely to employ restrictive licenses. Projects with less restrictive licenses tend to attract more contributors. proprietary software, on the other hand, argue that the openness of the source code allows malicious hackers to figure out its weaknesses. Anderson (2002) argues that under certain plausible assumptions, the openness of the system should have no impact on its security. Making bugs harder for hackers to find by keeping the source code hidden will also mean that software companies have a more difficult time identifying errors through "beta" testing, where lead users experiment with the product, also without access to the underlying source code. (While software firms will also do internal testing by employees with access to the source code, the effort devoted to these "alpha" tests is usually many times smaller than that in later-stage tests.) Thus, he concludes, "other things being equal, we expect that open and closed systems will exhibit similar growth in reliability and in security assurance." However, Anderson does not attempt to assess this claim empirically. Any such effort is difficult because hackers may attack a software program for reasons unrelated to the intrinsic security of the program; for instance, some hackers may derive more gratification from an attack on a leading public company, even though 10 Also in this paper, he suggests that individuals in commercial software companies may be reluctant to report programming problems to superiors, because the firm's management may unable to commit not to demand that they then address these issues. In open source projects, programmers can never be compelled to work on fixing a bug that they identify. He predicts that while the speed of the bug fixing process may be slower in open source projects, more problems will ultimately be identified. 
Further Issues about Open Source

Casadesus-Masanell and Ghemawat (2003) depict competition between an open
source operating system available at no cost and a proprietary commercial product. The crucial feature of their model is on the demand side: the larger the market share of a given operating system, the more valuable that system to users. This effect could be due to better learning about the program's features (if users contribute comments and suggestions to improve the product) or to the presence of complementary software developed by other firms. In this setting, the presence of an open source operating system leads the commercial firm to set lower prices, which in turn means that the overall use of operating systems is higher. However, the value of the commercial system for users is lower: for instance, the presence of a competing product may lead third-party developers to develop fewer complementary products for the commercial operating system. Thus, the presence of open source projects may either make society better or worse off. This model also suggests that in some cases, the proprietary operating system may be able to drive the market share of the open source alternative to zero, and also that the parameter ranges where this will occur need not correspond to those where such an action is socially desirable.
Schmidt and Schnitzer (2002) highlight similarly that open source software has social costs and benefits. Building on a line of economic reasoning that extends back to Arrow (1962) and even earlier, they highlight two countervailing effects. From a static point of view, free or nearly free open source will insure greater social welfare, as virtually any potential user will be able to access software. But from a dynamic perspective, with so few profits to be gleaned, developers may lack incentives to introduce new products. While career concerns and other incentives may motivate developers to identify bugs in open source programs and undertake certain modest adaptations to meet their own needs, they are unlikely to be sufficient to encourage major breakthroughs. The authors argue that while open source programs will enhance social welfare in some settings, this will be far from universal. They caution against subsidies that may lead to an undesirably high level of open source activity.
Saint-Paul (2003) reaches an even bleaker conclusion about the open source phenomenon. He employs a Romer-style endogenous growth model, in which both commercial firms and "philanthropists"-individuals who are willing to give their contributions away for free-innovate. He shows that the free contributions will lead to economic growth, but also reduce the profits, and hence the incentives to innovate, among commercial firms. Unless the proprietary sector is quite profitable, then the second effect will dominate, and innovation and growth be harmed by the presence of open source software. He argues that the negative effect is likely to be even stronger than his model shows, because he neglects, for instance, the possibility that philanthropic products do not meet users' needs as well as commercial products (though see the previous section for a counter-argument) and can also divert programming talent that could have been devoted to commercial products.
In a more informal piece, Shapiro and Varian (2004) suggest another consideration that formal models have not so far discussed: the impact on human capital and entrepreneurship. They suggest that an open system will facilitate learning by students as to how to program and will provide opportunities for third-party developers to introduce complementary products. They argue that all else being equal, these considerations should lead public policy makers in nations that seek to encourage the problem (Heller and Eisenberg, 1998) : the concern that the patenting of scientific knowledge will lead to lower research productivity, and hence eventually to reduced economic growth. Much of the discussion of these questions to date has featured broad assertions and anecdotal examples (as in Bok, 2003) . It is clear from these studies that institutions and researchers have responded to the increased incentives to commercialize products by engaging in more patenting and commercialization activities (for instance, Jaffe and Lerner, 2001; Lach and Schankerman, 2003) . Whether these commercial activities have detrimental effects on research and social welfare is much more ambiguous.
16 Given this initial and somewhat contradictory evidence, our ability to draw make that contribution. journals has remained constant. On the other hand, Murray and Stern (2003) have shown that papers published in the journal Nature Biotechnology are somewhat less likely to be cited in other articles once the corresponding patent application issues. They find that the papers with corresponding patents are initially more heavily cited than those without, but then their citation rate declines more sharply over time.
Although some aspects of open source software collaboration (such as electronic information exchange across the world) could easily be duplicated, other aspects would be harder to emulate. Consider, for example, the case of biotechnology. It may be impossible to break up large projects into small manageable and independent modules and there may not sufficient sophisticated users who can customize the molecules to their own needs. The tasks that are involved in making the product available to the end user involve larger expenditures than simply providing consumer support and friendlier user interfaces as in software. The costs of designing, testing, and seeking regulatory approval for a new drug are enormous.
More generally, in many industries the development of individual components require large-scale teamwork and substantial capital costs, as opposed to (for some software programs) individual contributions and no capital investment (besides the computer the programmer already has). Another obstacle is that in mass-market industries users are numerous and rather unsophisticated, and so deliver little peer recognition and ego gratification. This suggests that the open source model may not easily be transposed to other industries, but further investigation is warranted.
Can Firms Realize the Benefits of Open Source in Other Ways?
As the earlier discussion pointed out, corporations may emulate some of the benefits attached to open source production either by getting involved in open source themselves or by adopting institutional arrangements that deliver some of these benefits. First, using open source technology encourages users that they will not be "held up" by a future price increase after adopting a technology, and that they will always be able to tailor their technology to their own particular needs. Second, open source avoids the problem of a "patent thicket" when multiple firms have overlapping intellectual property rights, and at least one party attempts to extract a high fee for its particular contribution. Third, a firm might make a technology open source as a way of trying to certify a technological standard, in which case firms may contribute software to open source to benefit from the endorsement of such a standard, as the HP case discussed above illustrates.
Firms can also address these problems in non-open-source ways, such as patent pools, standard-setting organizations, and self-imposed commitments. In a patent pool, firms blend their patents with those of other firms. These pools allow users to access a number of firms' patents simultaneously, thereby avoiding the "patent thicket." In many cases, the pooling agreements also specify the pricing schedule in the agreement that establishes the pool, assuring that no party attempts to extract very high fees or to increase its fees after users are locked in. To be certain, patent pools raise a risk that they can be used to hinder entry, but these concerns can in part be addressed through a careful design of the pool (Lerner and Tirole, 2004a; Lerner, Strojwas, and Tirole, 2003) .
Standard-setting organizations offer an alternative path for the certification of new technologies. Often firms can choose between standard-setting organizations, and they can seek an endorsement for an emerging technology from an independent and prestigious organization, or use a more complacent one (Lerner and Tirole, 2004b) .
These bodies also help address the other concerns, frequently asking contributors of the key technologies to commit to license the technology on "reasonable and nondiscriminatory" terms or to make various other concessions.
Self-imposed commitments can serve much the same role. For instance, firms can commit to license technologies at a given price schedule, or they can commit to provide sufficient information so that users can tailor the technology. An example of the latter is Microsoft's Shared Source Initiative, through the firm shares source code with customers, partners, and governments. One open question about many of these self-imposed programs is the extent to which the commitments can be enforced if the firm subsequently changes its design.
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Open source production may seem like a unique and idiosyncratic realm.
However, many of the issues are seen elsewhere in high-technology industries: when and how to share technology, how to set common standards, and how to combine freely available and commercial components arise both in the open source and the commercial realm. Open source projects and traditional firms can borrow from each other innovative approaches to the underlying problems.
Open Source and Academia
Open source and academia have many parallels. The most obvious parallel relates to motivation. As in open source, the direct financial returns from writing academic articles are typically nonexistent, but career concerns and the desire for peer recognition provide powerful inducements.
Other similar dynamics are also at work. Consider, for instance, the discussion of motivation for programmers when choosing an open source project to contribute to. As we highlight above, a critical goal is the selection of a project which is likely to continue to be successful, so that the programmers' contributions are widely recognized, yet which at the same time has interesting and challenging programming challenges to be addressed. These criteria should be familiar to anyone who has advised a doctoral student on the choice of a thesis topic! At the same time, however, there are some substantial differences between the two realms. Here, we will highlight two areas where academic economists could learn from the open source realm. The first of these relates to the incentives to create public goods. Open source contributors often create substantial bodies of code, which are made widely available when completed. Far too often in academic economics, however, we do not see similar dissemination.
18 For instance, an author-after creating a unique data-set for a project-may simply save this information on his hard disk, rather than making it publicly available. At the same time, it is heartening to us how much of open source activities can be understood within existing economic frameworks, despite the presence of claims to the contrary. The labor and industrial organization literatures provide lenses through which the structure of open source projects, the role of contributors, and the movement's ongoing evolution can be viewed.
